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Alimony Awards Under Middle-Tier
Equal Protection Scrutiny
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Reed v.
Reed,' lawmakers were generally free to draw legislative classifi-
cations based upon gender and did so frequently.2 Even the suf-
frage movement, which secured women the right to vote,3 had little
impact upon gender-based statutory distinctions.4 With the Reed
decision the Supreme Court brought gender-based legislative clas-
sifications within the scrutiny of the equal protection clause.5 Nev-
ertheless, Reed became uncertain precedent in the area of equal
protection. Although it was obvious that gender-based classifica-
tions were to be scrutinized, commentators and lower courts alike
were uncertain as to which of the two traditional degrees of scru-
tiny was being applied.6 Language in Reed indicated that the
lower, traditional rational relationship test should be employed;
however, the opinion of the Court in a later case implied that the
upper-tier of strict scrutiny would be more proper.7 In 1976, the
Court established a third level of scrutiny for gender-based classi-
fications,8 a middle-tier analysis which required that gender-based
classifications be substantially related to important governmental
interests.9
1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
2. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1874); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
4. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 355 U.S. 464 (1948).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 904 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CInN. L. REv. 1,
10 (1975).
7. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
8. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
9. "[Cjlassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at
197.
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In Orr v. Orr,10 the Supreme Court e. .nined Alabama's ali-
mony statutes under this middle-tier scrutiny. The statutes" al-
lowed alimony awards only to females. 12 The Court held that the
statutory provisions were an unconstitutional denial of equal pro-
tection.13
The application of this substantial relationship test concerns
not only parties who may be seeking divorces and the legislatures
in eight states whose alimony statutes do not appear to pass its
scrutiny,' 4 but it also concerns those involved with other areas of
law employing gender-based classifications. Equal protection
scrutiny of gender-based classifications becomes even more signifi-
cant in light of the uncertain status of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment.15
1. HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
TO GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying per-
sons equal protection of the law.'6 Prior to this decade, equal pro-
tection analysis of the relationship between legislative objectives
and legislative classifications generally involved two tiers of judi-
cial scrutiny. Under the lower or traditional level, legislation is up-
held if the court can find any rational relationship between the
10. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
11. ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51 to -53 (1975); note 117 infra.
12. "In the absence of a statute so providing there is no authority in this state for
awarding alimony against the wife in favor of the husband." Baggett v. Bag-
gett, 47 Ala. App. 539,258 So. 2d 735 (1972); Davis v. Davis, 279 Ala. 643, 644, 189
So. 2d 158, 160 (1966).
13. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
14. ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51 to -53 (1975); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 34-1211 (RepL 1962); GA.
CODE ANN. § 30-201 (Supp. 1978) (This statute is referred to in text; however,
in 1979 the Georgia Legislature amended the statute to provide alimony to
either party. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (Supp. 1979)); IDAHO CODE § 32-706
(1974); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:19 (1968); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney 1977); S.C. CODE §§ 20-3-
120, -130 (1976); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977).
15. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). The House approved
the amendment by a vote of 354-23. 117 CONG. REC. H. 9392 (Oct. 12, 1971).
Senate approval came on an 84-8 vote. 118 CONG. REC. S. 4612 (Mar. 22, 1972).
Congress passed the amendment on March 23, 1972. 118 CONG. REc. H. 2423
(Mar. 23, 1972). Thirty-five states have ratified, fifteen have not. There have
been attempted rescissions by four states, including Nebraska. U.S. NEws &
WoPno REPORT, Nov. 28, 1977, at 32.
H.J. Res. 638 proposed to extend the time for ratification until 1982. H.J.
Res. 638, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 17283 (1978).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No state shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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classification and its permissible governmental objective.17 How-
ever, when a legislative classification is based upon a suspect clas-
sification such as race,18 alienage,19 or national origin,20 or upon a
fundamental right,2 1 it is subject to the strict judicial scrutiny of
upper-tier analysis. The use of a suspect classification will be up-
held only if it serves a compelling governmental interest, is drawn
as narrowly as possible, and employs the least drastic means avail-
able to achieve the statutory objective.
22
Reed v. Reed 23 was the first case in which the Supreme Court
placed a gender-based classification under equal protection scru-
tiny.24 Prior to this landmark decision, the Court had frequently
upheld gender-based classifications in a variety of situations.25
In Reed, the plaintiff challenged an Idaho probate code provi-
sion which required that preference be given to males over fe-
males in instances where both applicants for letters of
administration were from the same entitlement class. 2 6 The Court
referred to a 1920 tax discrimination case for a phrase expressing
the test applicable in order to invalidate the statute: "A classifica-
tion 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike.' "27 Although the Court identified
the issue as whether or not the statutory preference of males over
females bore a rational relationship to the state objective,28 it did
not apply the traditional rational relationship analysis.29 The stat-
ute was held unconstitutional even though its objective of reducing
the probate court work load was "not without some legitimacy."30
Such legitimacy would probably have been sufficient to sustain a
classification under a traditional rational relationship test.
17. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971).
18. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964).
19. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
20. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
21. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).
22. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 10.
25. See note 2 supra.
26. The code provision was effectively repealed when the Idaho Legislature
adopted the Uniform Probate Code in 1972.
27. 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920)).
28. Id.
29. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (material
noted with astrisk).
30. 404 U.S. at 76.
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Frontiero v. Richardson31 involved a challenge to a federal stat-
utory provision which required servicewomen, but not servicemen,
to prove, before they became eligible for increased housing and
medical benefits, that they provided over one-half of their spouse's
support. The application of the rational relationship test in Reed
was the springboard for an argument by four of the justices in
Frontiero that gender should be recognized as a suspect classifica-
tion.3
2
Justice Brennan delivered a plurality opinion (joined by Jus-
tices Douglas, White, and Marshall), expressing the view that gen-
der should be considered a suspect classification.33 Justice Powell,
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackman stated in a concurring
opinion that it was unnecessary to classify gender as suspect,
3 4
reasoning that Reed was sufficient authority to overrule the provi-
sion before them and that the court should await the ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment before taking too much action in the
area of gender-based classifications.
35
Although Reed indicated that gender would be reviewed under
some type of rational relationship test, the plurality opinion in
Frontiero specifically expressed the view that gender ought to be a
suspect classification. The justices, however, were not in agree-
ment as to how much scrutiny gender-based classifications should
receive. This indecisiveness understandably caused confusion
among lower courts and commentators as to which level of analy-
sis was appropriate for gender-based classifications.
36
In Kahn v. Shevin,37 the Court upheld a Florida property tax
exemption allowed to widows but denied widowers. In upholding
such differential treatment of similarly situated males and fe-
males, the court reasoned that:
This is not a case like Frontiero v. Richardson. . . where the Govern-
ment denied its female employees both substantive and procedural bene-
fits granted males "solely ... for administrative convenience." ..... We
deal here with a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for
which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.
3 8
Kahn has been interpreted as holding that the substantial rela-
tionship test will allow statutory classifications discriminating
upon gender if the statute is intended to compensate women for
31. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
32. Id. at 682.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. See notes 55-57 & accompanying text infra.
37. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
38. Id. at 355 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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past discrimination. 39 It is difficult, however, to determine to what
extent the Kahn ruling reflected the compensatory purpose of the
statute, or whether the decision can be attributed to the high de-
gree of deference afforded states in the area of taxation.40 The lan-
guage above indicates that the deference issue was a major factor.
The Court shed more light on this area when a slightly different
test was enunciated in Craig v. Boren.4 1 That case provided the
first indication of a third level of equal protection scrutiny. Follow-
ing a summary of decisions involving gender-based equal protec-
tion analysis prior to 1976, the Court reviewed an Oklahoma
statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under age
twenty-one and females under age eighteen. The test utilized was
similar to the one subsequently employed by the Court in Orr:
"[T] o withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish
that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." 2
The two phases of this substantial relationship test evolved
from decisions which followed the Reed analysis. The first group
of opinions followed Reed more closely than the second and held
that administrative convenience 43 or "old notions of role typing"44
could not sustain statutory classifications based upon gender;
hence, the important governmental interest requirement was cre-
ated. The second group of decisions relied less directly upon Reed.
These cases attempted to use gender where other, more narrowly
drawn classifications, would have been more closely related to the
governmental objective.45 Thus, the requirement that classifica-
tions "be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives"46 became solidified.
Although the Court agreed with the state that traffic safety was
an important governmental function, the statute in Craig v. Boren
did not withstand the second phase of the substantial relationship
39. See note 55 infra.
40. "Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal
protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifica-
tions and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems
of taxation." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359
(1973) (footnote omitted). See also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656,
661-62 (1975); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
41. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
42. Id. at 197.
43. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
44. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
45. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
508 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975).
46. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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analysis because the gender-based distinction was not related
closely enough to traffic safety.4 7 The difference between males
and females with respect to the drinking of 3.2% beer and driving
did not warrant the difference in their treatment. The court has
summarized this middle-tier test as simply a question of whether
the difference between males and females with respect to the ob-
ject of the legislation warrants a difference in treatment.48
Ill. THE FACTS OF ORR
In February of 1974, the Circuit Court of Lee County Alabama
issued a divorce decree dissolving the marriage of William and Lil-
ian Orr.49 The decree incorporated a stipulation by the parties
whereby Mr. Orr agreed to pay $1,240 per month alimony.50 In
1976, Mrs. Orr began contempt proceedings to collect $5,524 of un-
paid alimony as well as attorneys' fees. Mr. Orr submitted a mo-
tion requesting that Alabama's alimony statutes be declared
unconstitutional because they provided that alimony may be
awarded to wives upon divorce but not to husbands. This constitu-
tional challenge was his only defense, and he did not claim ali-
mony for himself.
51
Without referring to authority or stating its reasons for uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the statutes, the circuit court denied
Mr. Orr's motion and entered a judgment against him for the ac-
crued alimony.
52
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the circuit court
and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.53 The appellate
court relied heavily upon a Georgia case which reasoned that ali-
mony statutes providing awards to women only were constitution-
ally valid as legislation aimed at "cushioning the financial impact
of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a dispro-
portionally heavy burden."54 This compensatory rationale paral-
leled that which had been endorsed in Kahn. The court felt that
the same reasoning which upheld the Florida tax exemption for
widows applied equally to wives after divorce. "It is the wife of a
broken marriage who needs financial assistance for whom the ali-
mony statutes of Alabama were designed."' 55
47. Id. at 204.
48. Id. at 199.
49. Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 906, 906 (Ala. 1977) (personal opinion).
50. Id. at 907; Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
51. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979).
52. Brief of Appellant at 3.
53. Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 904 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
54. Id. at 905 (quoting Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert
denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975) (quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)).
55. Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d at 905.
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The Alabama Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to re-
view the judgment but later quashed the writ as improvidently
granted, without issuing a majority opinion. 6 Two justices noted
that the statutes were "designed to foster and preserve the family
unit, a constitutionally permissible area for legislation. 5 7 How-
ever, one justice dissented because he felt the statute lacked the
necessary relationship to its purposes and that the objective of
protecting only the lone female was improper.5 8
IV. THE ORR DECISION
After granting certiorari and dismissing several preliminary is-
sues,5 9 the Supreme Court began analysis of the case by setting
forth the appropriate standard of judicial scrutiny for gender-
based legislative classifications. As set out in Craig v. Boren,60 the
standard requires that "classifications by gender must serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."'6' The first step of the Court's
substantial relationship analysis was an examination of three gov-
ernmental objectives which Alabama's alimony statutes might pos-
sibly have served.
62
Reinforcement of the State's preference for a family role model
in which the wife was dependent upon the husband for her sup-
port is arguably a valid statutory objective.63 Because this purpose
was based upon stereotypes of traditional family roles, it would
have failed to sustain the Alabama statute even if the statute had
56. 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 909.
59. Before reaching the equal protection question, the Court addressed three is-
sues which were not raised by either of the parties, or by the Alabama courts.
440 U.S. at 271. Presumably, these issues were dealt with in response to Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent. Id. at 290. The preliminary issue was standing. Mr.
Orr was granted standing despite the fact that he may have had to pay the
alimony judgment even if his equal protection challenge was successful. The
second issue was the timeliness of his challenge. Since both of the Alabama
dourts had decided the constitutional issue upon the merits, the Court could
not regard those decisions as resting upon adequate state grounds and ac-
cordingly could decide the issue. The last issue was whether the alimony
obligation was a matter of state contract law since it arose from a stipulation
of the parties which was later incorporated in the divorce decree. Again, be-
cause the lower courts had clearly based their decisions upon the constitu-
tional issue, the Supreme Court was allowed to address ic. See, e.g., Stern v.
Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 332 A.2d 78 (1973).
60. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
61. Id. at 197.
62. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 278.
63. Id. at 279.
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been substantially related to the achievement of that objective. 64
This was illustrated when the United States Supreme Court invali-
dated a Utah statute providing different ages of majority for males
and females because it was based upon stereotypes. 65
The Court readily accepted two objectives arguably served
under the Alabama statutory scheme.66 The state court had
adopted the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court67 that stat-
utes providing alimony to women only were closely akin to the tax
assistance given women in Kahn v. Shevin 68 and were thus consti-
tutionally acceptable.69 The Alabama court said that the Kahn
reasoning was "equally applicable in the instance of a wife in-
volved in seeking alimony pursuant to a divorce. It is the wife of a
64. Id. at 279-80.
65. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). The statute allowed a court to award
child support for males up to age twenty-one but for females only until they
reached age eighteen. The Utah court attempted to justify this difference in
treatment with
"old notions," namely, "that generally it is the man's primary respon-
sibility to provide a home and its essentials,".., that "it is a salutary
thing for him to get a good education and/or training before he un-
dertakes those responsibilities,"... that "girls tend generally to ma-
ture physically, emotionally and mentally before boys"; and that
"they generally tend to marry earlier."
Id. at 10 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 318, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012
(1974)). The Court accepted the assumption that generally it is a man's pri-
mary responsibility to provide a home, making it important for him to get
adequate education and training before he assumes that responsibility, and
that females may tend to marry earlier than males. Id. at 14. However, as in
Orr, traditional ideas regarding family roles failed to support gender-based
discrimination because they imposed criteria unrelated to the statutory ob-
jective of child support. Id.
A child, male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female des-
tined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the
male for the market-place and the world of ideas. Women's activities
and responsibilities are increasing and expanding. Coeducation is a
fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in business, in the profes-
sions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education
is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and a
proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified age of minority is re-
quired for the boy in order to assure him parental support while he
attains his education and training, so, too, it is for the girl. To distin-
guish between the two on educational grounds is to be self-serving., if
the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can
be expected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her
education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has
long imposed.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
66. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 280.
67. Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352,206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929
(1975).
68. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
69. Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d at 905 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
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broken marriage who needs financial assistance for whom the ali-
mony statutes of Alabama were designed.
o7 0
The Supreme Court found that two objectives could be gleaned
from this reasoning. The first of these was "provid[ing] help for
needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for need."' The second was
"6compensating women for past discrimination during marriage,
which assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves
in the working world following divorce.
'72
As to the second objective, the Court held "that assisting needy
spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective. '73
The Court's explanation was limited to a quote from a previous
case which held that "[r] eduction of the disparity in economic con-
dition between men and women... [was] an important govern-
mental objective."7 4
Having satisfied the first phase of the substantial relationship
test, the equal protection analysis would normally have progressed
to the second phase. Gender would have been examined to deter-
mine if it was "a sufficiently 'accurate proxy'.., for dependency to
establish that the gender classification rests 'upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation.' ,,75 The other objective would have been examined to
determine "whether women had in fact been significantly discrimi-
nated against in the sphere to which the statute applied a sex
based classification, leaving the sexes 'not similarly situated with
respect to opportunities' in that sphere.
'76
Orr does not indicate whether a gender-based classification is
substantially related to either objective, since the second phase of
equal protection analysis for both objectives was precluded by the
procedure specified in the Alabama alimony statutes. Individual-
ized hearings as to the parties' financial situations were already a
requisite formality in the process of awarding alimony.77 Accord-
ingly, even if sex were an accurate proxy for dependency resulting
in need after divorce, automatically awarding alimony only to fe-
males would not be justified, as actual dependency could be ascer-
tained in each case at these hearings. For the same reason, the
statute is defective with respect to the purpose of compensating
70. Id. at 905.
71. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 280.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)).
75. Id. at 280-81 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 204, and Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. at 76).
76. Id. at 281 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)) (emphasis
in original).
77. Id. See ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 to -53 (1975); note 115 infra.
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women for discrimination during marriage. Any marriage-based
discrimination which may have left the wife "not similarly situated
with respect to opportunities in that sphere"7 8 may also be deter-
mined at hearings on the financial position of the parties in each
individual case.
Alabama's alimony statutes were overinclusive because they
extended the benefit of alimony to some females who did not need
it. At the same time, they were underinclusive in that they were
not allowing alimony to needy males. 79 In some situations these
flaws may produce results contrary to the objectives of the statute.
The situation in which a financially secure wife who has been a
major source of income for the couple is awarded alimony from the
needy husband under the Alabama alimony statutes, is one exam-
ple.80 Clearly in this situation the male is the needy spouse and
just as clearly the wife has not been discriminated against or left in
a position where she is unable to support herself because of her
role in the marriage, yet she is not obligated to pay alimony and
may even receive it. Under a gender-neutral statute, the wife
would undoubtedly have to bear the burden of alimony given this
situation.
V. ANALYSIS
Orr should not have a great impact upon the equal protection
doctrine in the area of gender-based classifications. The Court ap-
plied the substantial relationship test first set out in Craig v. Bo-
ren81 and used in gender-based classification cases since.8 2 But
because it did not reach the second phase of the substantial rela-
tionship analysis, the Orr opinion does not reveal whether or not a
classification drawn upon gender is substantially related to the im-
portant governmental objectives of assisting needy spouses and
compensating women for past discrimination.8 3
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals felt the statutes were a
constitutional application of gender-based classifications because
they provided assistance to women.8 4 In light of the somewhat
confusing messages embodied in the opinions of the Court on the
78. See note 71 supra.
79. Orr v. Orr, Civ. 1006, slip op. at 3 (Ala. Civ. App. May 30, 1979).
80. ALA. CODE § 30-2-52 (1975) allows an alimony award to the wife without con-
sideration of her resources. See note 115 infra.
81. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
82. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
83. The opinion did, however, incorporate the concept of "tailoring" in the sub-
stantial relationship analysis which had previously been associated with the
strict scrutiny of suspect classifications and fundamental interests. See Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. See notes 52-54 supra.
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issue of gender-based classifications, the Alabama court was prob-
ably justified in believing that a statute designed to provide eco-
nomic assistance to females was constitutionally acceptable.
85
The opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals relied heav-
ily upon Murphy v. Murphy,8 6 the case in which the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state's alimony
statute87 upon the authority of Kahn.88 That law was similar to the
Alabama statutes in that it provided awards only to women. In
Murphy, the Georgia Supreme Court outlined the compensatory
rationale upheld by the Court in Kahn and said:
These reasons are equally applicable and cogent in the case of a depen-
dent wife involved in the demise of a marriage who is seeking a divorce
and alimony or only alimony. It is the dependent wife of a broken mar-
riage for whom the alimony statutes of Georgia were designed to provide
financial support.8 9
Accordingly, the Georgia alimony statute was upheld over an
equal protection challenge, even though it provided alimony only
to women. 90
In his dissent in Kahn, Justice Brennan stated that even
though the Florida objective of assisting widows through a $500
property tax exemption rose to the level of a compelling state in-
85. See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
86. 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
87. As revised, GA. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (Supp. 1978) provides:
[Alimony is an allowance out of the husband's estate, made for
the support of the wife when living separate from him. It is either
temporary or permanent.] The wife shall not be entitled to alimony
if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that the sepa-
ration between the parties was caused by the wife's adultery or de-
sertion. In all cases in which alimony is sought by the wife, the court
shall receive evidence of the factual cause of the separation even
though one or both of the parties may also seek a divorce, regardless
of the grounds upon which a divorce is sought or granted by the
court. In all other cases in which alimony is sought by the wife, ali-
mony is authorized, but not required, to be awarded to the wife in
accordance with her needs and the husband's ability to pay. In de-
termining whether or not to grant alimony to the wife, the court shall
also consider evidence of the husband's conduct toward the wife.
Should the husband die prior to the court's order on the issues of
alimony, the rights of the wife shall survive and be a lien upon the
estate of the deceased. Pending final determination by the court of
the wife's right to alimony, the husband shall not make any substan-
tial change in the assets of his estate except in the course of ordinary
business affairs and bona fide transfers for value.
The bracketed material indicates the former statute, encountered by the
court. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (Supp. 1974). Subsequent revisions reflect the
Orr decision. The former statute was interpreted to provide awards to wo-
men only. Lowry v. Lowry, 283 Ga. 593, 234 S.E.2d 509 (1977).
88. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
89. 232 Ga. at 353, 206 S.E.2d at 459.
90. See, e.g., Whitt v. Vathier, 316 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 1975).
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terest, it denied equal protection because the statutory objective
could be met more efficiently through the use of a more carefully
tailored legislative classification.91
Although the Florida tax statute and the Alabama alimony pro-
vision were both economic benefits awarded only to females in an
overly broad manner upon the demise of a marital relationship,
one reason for upholding the property tax exemption and invali-
dating the alimony provision is the strength of the state interest
involved. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals thought the statutes
were a constitutional application of gender-based classifications
because they provided assistance to women. This reasoning was
based upon Kahn, which upheld an overly broad tax exemption.
As a result, Orr implies that a state statute discriminating solely
upon the basis of gender will not be upheld even if it compensates
women for past discrimination unless the state has a sufficiently
strong interest in the area of legislation.
A. The Strength of the State Interest
As mentioned previously, the interest of the State of Florida in
its taxation policy was quite strong. Traditionally state taxation
powers have been afforded great respect.92 The strength of that
interest was a large factor in sustaining different treatment of simi-
larly situated individuals according only to their gender.
9 3
The right to regulate and control the conditions surrounding di-
vorce is generally recognized as an exclusive state right.
94
Notwithstanding this, Orr indicates that when individualized hear-
ings already exist, this interest is not strong enough to justify the
different treatment of persons who are similarly situated with re-
spect to the statutory objective of compensating needy spouses.
Florida's interest in taxation sustained a statutory classification
which could have been more narrowly drawn; however, Alabama's
interest in controlling the financial relations of private parties to
provide for needy spouses was not strong enough to sustain an
overly-broad statute to that effect.
In other decisions involving equal protection the Court has spe-
cifically recognized the strength of the legislative interest in the
area where gender-based classification is employed. While this
state interest component is not the basis for these decisions, it
does appear to be one of the factors considered. These decisions
91. 416 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. See note 41 supra.
93. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 355.
94. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53 Hawaii 302, 492 P.2d 939 (1972); Collins v.
Oklahoma Tax Cornm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968); Smitheal v. Smitheal, 518
S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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have indicated that the interest of the state in controlling divorce
is not as strong as the interest of a state in running a self-sufficient
disability insurance program95 or the interest of Congress in ad-
ministering the promotion of Naval officers.96 Statutes in these ar-
eas have employed a strong legislative interest to sustain different
treatment of persons who were similarly situated solely upon the
basis of their sex.
A federal statute which gave female officers a longer period of
tenured service than males before mandatory retirement was up-
held in Schlesinger v. Ballard.97 In that statutory scheme, officers
were in competition for promotion only with other officers simi-
larly situated, yet female officers were given more time for promo-
tion.98 The Court upheld the provision because it felt Congress
could have rationally presumed female officers did not have the
same opportunity as males for advancement before mandatory re-
tirement and therefore attempted to compensate women for this
lack of opportunity.99 The Ballard opinion specifically noted that
Congress was responsible for deciding how the armed forces
should go about being prepared for battle and achieve "a flow of
promotions commensurate with the Navy's current needs and...
motivate qualified commissioned officers to so conduct themselves
that they may realistically look forward to higher levels of com-
mand."1 00 Respect for this legislative interest appears to have
been an important factor in allowing dissimilar treatment of males
and females.
Even the authority of a state to control alcoholic beverages
under the twenty-first amendment was insufficient to sustain dif-
ferent treatment of males and females with respect to the
purchase of 3.2% beer.' 0 ' After examining statistics presented by
the state, the Court decided that "if maleness is to serve as a proxy
for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered an
unduly tenuous 'fit' 102 and went on to "hold, that the Twenty-first
Amendment does not save the invidious gender-based discrimina-
tion from invalidation as a denial of equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 3
The interest of the State of California in maintaining a self-sup-
porting disability insurance program was sufficient to allow the
95. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
96. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
97, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
98. Id. at 518-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 508.
100. Id. at 510.
101. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1976).
102. Id. at 201-02.
103. Id. at 204-05.
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state to exclude disabilities affecting only females.' o4 The consti-
tutionality of the program was upheld even though it covered male,
sex-related disabilities while excluding disabilities from normal
pregnancy and childbirth. 0 5 The state objective could have been
achieved through less drastic, gender neutral means. 0 6
The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting
nature of its insurance program. Similarly, it has an interest in distribut-
ing the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at
an adequate level for disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all
disabilities inadequately. Finally, California has a legitimate concern in
maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly burden
participating employees, particularly low-income employees who may be
most in need of the disability insurance.
These policies provide an objective and wholly non-invidious basis for
the State's decision not to create a more comprehensive insurance pro-
gram than it has.
10 7
It appears then, that a state may draw statutory classifications
upon gender only if the state interest in the important governmen-
tal objective is sufficiently strong whether or not the statute's pur-
pose is to compensate women for past discrimination.
In light of past decisions, a state interest is more likely to be
viewed as strong enough to sustain a compensatory statute if it
concerns the economics of the state. In both Kahn'0 8 and
Geduldig v. Aiello'0 9 the state was directly involved financially
with persons within the classification. In Geduldig the state's dis-
ability insurance program would have been thoroughly disrupted
had the equal protection challenge been successful. In Kahn the
state would have had to modify their system of taxation.
B. Statutes From Other States
Alimony statutes in other jurisdictions fall basically into four
categories: those providing awards to females only," 0 those
awarding to either spouse at the court's discretion,"' those provid-
104. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
105. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 505 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 496.
108. 416 U.S. 351.
109. 417 U.S. 484.
110. See note 14 supra.
111. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (Supp. 1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 16-912 to -13
(West Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE § 598.11 (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6041610
(Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19., 721 (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art.
16, § 3 (Supp. 1979); MICH. Comp. LAws § 552.23 (Supp. 1979); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2A: 34-23 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STATS. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 50-11 to -16.1 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 1278 (Supp. 1978); R.I GEN. LAws §§ 15-5-6, -7 (1978); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
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ing awards to either spouse after considering specific factors,1 1 2
and those adopting or patterned after the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, which allows an award to either spouse in light of spe-
cific need factors.1 1 3 Examination of these statutes will be limited
to those in the first category, as they are similar to those invali-
dated in Orr.n1 4 The other categories present no equal protection
issue since they do not employ gender-based classifications.
Alabama's alimony statutes provided support to the wife when
her estate was insufficient to support her or when divorce was
granted due to the misconduct of either party." 5 In each case, the
§ 25-4-41 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 754 (Supp. 1979); W.VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1976).
112. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-82
(Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (Supp. 1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47
(Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1977); VA.
CODE § 20-107 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.090 (Supp. 1978); Wis.
STAT. § 247.26 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
113. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308 (amended 1973). See ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1973); ILL REV. STAT.
ch. 40, § 504 (Supp. 1979) (P.A. 80-923, § 504); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.200 (Supp.
1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335 (Vernon 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-
322 (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. LAWS § 518.552 (Supp. 1978).
114. Nebraska's alimony provision directs the trial court to consider certain fac-
tors in making the award to either spouse. The language would appear to be
neutral. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Reissue 1978) provides:
payment of such alimony by one party to the other and division of
property as may be reasonable, having regard for the circumstances
of the parties, duration of the marriage, a history of the contributions
to the marriage by each party, including contributions to the care and
education of the children, and interruption of personal careers or ed-
ucational opportunities, and the ability of the supported party to en-
gage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of
any minor children in the custody of such party.
The legislative history to this provision reveals that:
what we've tried to do here was put in some clauses as to what the
court should consider in awarding alimony because right now there
is a question as to whether or not the interruption of education and
personal careers is cause for awarding more alimony and we've tried
to say this shall be one of the things that the court shall consider
Comm. on Judiciary, Comm. Statement on L.B. 1015 Before Interim Study
Comm., Neb. Leg., 83d Sess. 34 (Feb. 11, 1974) (remarks of Walt Radcliff). But
see Essex v. Essex, 195 Neb. 385, 238 N.W.2d 235 (1976); Magruder v. Magru-
der, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973) (ultimate criteria is reasonableness).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-367 (Reissue 1978) gives the divorce court the authority
to require a husband to pay a wife any amount necessary to enable her to
bring the divorce action.
115. ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1975) provides: "If the wife has no separate estate or if it
be insufficient for her maintenance, the judge, upon granting a divorce, at his
discretion, may order to the wife an allowance out of the estate of the hus-
band, taking into consideration the value thereof and the condition of his
family." Section 30-2-52 provides: "If the divorce is in favor of the wife for the
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trial court was directed to consider the financial circumstances of
the husband.
Other state statutes which provide alimony to wives only gener-
ally direct the trial court to consider several factors. The hus-
band's ability to provide support, the wife's need and the conduct
of the parties are usually examined before the award and its size
are determined.116 The phrasing of these statutes indicates that
their basic purpose is to provide private support for females who
would presumably be candidates for state support in the absence
of income from their husbands. While this certainly is an impor-
tant objective, Orr implies that this does not create a state interest
strong enough to sustain a gender specific classification when that
objective could be met just as readily through a gender-neutral
classification.
Aid to needy spouses has been accepted as an important gov-
ernmental objective and satisfies the first phase of the substantial
relationship test.117 Since each of these gender specific statutes
directs the trial court to consider the financial cirucumstances of at
least the husband before making the alimony award to the female,
they are subject to the same flaw which proved to be the downfall
of the Alabama statutes. The statutes would fail an equal protec-
tion test because the purpose of assisting needy spouses could be
met without any additional administrative inconvenience while
the financial circumstances of the parties are being considered
under the current statute. Thus, just as in Orr, the objective can
be satisfied without placing the burden solely upon husbands
through a gender-neutral statute.
The possible objective of compensating women for past dis-
crimination in marriage may be read into these statutes as it was
in Orr. 118 But again as in Orr, this purpose may be achieved
misconduct of the husband, the judge trying the case shall have the right to
make an allowance to the wife out of the husband's estate, or not make her an
allowance as the circumstances of the case may justify, and if an allowance is
made, it must be as liberal as the estate of the husband will permit, regard
being had to the condition of his family and to all the circumstances of the
case." Section 30-2-53 provides: "If the divorce is in favor of the husband for
the misconduct of the wife and if the judge in his discretion deems the wife
entitled to an allowance, the allowance must be regulated by the ability of the
husband and the nature of the misconduct of the wife."
116. See Calderwood v. Calderwood, 114 N.H. 651, 327 A.2d 704 (1974); Leigh v.
Leigh, 66 A.D.2d 735, 411 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1978); Finder v. Finder, 65 A.D.2d 536,
409 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1978); Beasley v. Beasley, 264 S.C. 611, 216 S.E.2d 535 (1975);
McNaughton v. McNaughton, 258 S.C. 554, 189 S.E.2d 820 (1972); Gramme v.
Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978); note 117 infra.




through a gender-neutral statute at the individual hearings which
already take place under the existing statute.
Accordingly, it would appear that each of the statutes in this
group would fall subject to the same claim of unconstitutionality
which befell the Alabama statutes. The apparent objectives of
these underinclusive statutes could be met with no increased bur-
den upon the state and without requiring that males support
spouses who are not in need or not the victims of past discrimina-
tion.
C. Alternatives Upon Remand
After Orr the State of Alabama had two courses of action upon
remand. Alimony benefits could either be extended to persons of
either gender or denied to both." 9 Upon remand, the Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals selected the former alternative and reluc-
tantly extended alimony to males.120 After determining the legis-
lative purpose underlying the alimony statute, the Court of Civil
Appeals decided that awards could not be withheld from females.
It is clear to this court that the statues, notwithstanding the deficiency
which the Supreme Court found to exist, were at the time of their promul-
gation substantially related to the appropriate legislative objective of pro-
viding monetary assistance to the financially needy wife and that this
objective continues, as a pragmatic matter in appropriate circumstances,
in its viability today. Furthermore, it occurs to us that the legislature is
quite cognizant of the fact that the female in appropriate cases who has
virtually contributed her adult life to the maintenance of the marital rela-
tionship is arguably not destined for "the market place. . . ." Put another
way, a female who has virtually never been employed outside the home,
but has been a mother, wife, and/or homemaker for a number of years is
not in a favored position to obtain gainful employment.
As a matter of predominant legislative purpose then, we are not pre-
pared to eliminate the current statutory benefits available to needy fe-
males inasmuch as we are of the opinion that the legislature would not do
SO.121
Several other states have chosen this alternative. They have re-
moved their statutes from the gender specific category by ascer-
taining the legislative purpose and deciding that it could be met
equally as well by extending the opportunity for alimony to both
sexes.
Beal v. Beal122 illustrates this alternative. Beal was a decision
in which the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals followed on remand
of Orr. In Beal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the
state's original alimony statute failed even the lower rational rela-
119. Id. at 272.
120. Orr v. Orr, No. 1006 (Ala. Civ. App., filed May 30, 1979).
121. Id. at 5.
122. 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978).
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tionship test because it was not based upon a legitimate state in-
terest.
By its repeal and replacement of the alimony statute in 1977 the legisla-
ture has made it clear that as between abolishing alimony and making it
available to husbands in appropriate cases, it would choose the latter. We
conclude that the dominant legislative purpose of the alimony statute, as
it stood when this action was brought, is correctly served by treating it as
extending eligibility to men as well as women.-"
Although the Maine legislature repealed and replaced its provi-
sion for alimony to women only, the state of New York has cor-
rected this flaw in their statute entirely by judicial interpretation.
In Thaler v. Thaler,124 a New York Supreme Court found that the
state's alimony statute denied equal protection because it allowed
awards only to women. Declining to invalidate the provision, the
court extended the benefit to both males and females.
12 5
XI. CONCLUSION
Whether these statutes, which provide awards only to females,
are changed by the legislature of the state or by a judicial interpre-
tation allowing alimony to males as well, the impact upon alimony
law may not be great. Like Alabama, courts which are reluctant to
allow alimony to men may still be very penurious with such
awards. Only in situations where the female is self-sufficient and
has means of support relatively equal to that of the male will any
impact be felt. States are still free to impose other criteria which
tend to weigh heavier upon males because of social structure and
role tendencies. States may direct the divorce court to consider
the length of the marriage, the number of children needing sup-
port, the behavior of the parties toward each other, and the ability
of the dependent spouse to support him or herself.126 Such consid-
erations provide ample opportunity for trial courts to rest the bur-
den of support upon the male.
However, where the wife does not have the extra burden of chil-
dren to support and is capable of providing for herself at a level
near that which she was accustomed during marriage, Orr may
have a great impact. Awarding alimony to a party who needs it
regardless of sex is a just result, not only for the husbands who
may have been unduly burdened under a statute similar to Ala-
bama's, but for society and divorced wives as well.
Gary D. Gilson '81
123. Id. at 76.
124. 89 Misc. 2d 315, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
125. Id. at 339-40.
126. See notes 114-15 supra.
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